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Development of EU Energy Law 
 
Although two out of the three founding treaties of what is now the European Union 
(EU) ± the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (which expired in 2002) 
and the 1957 European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Treaty ± had energy 
at their heart, EU energy law was limited in its scope and impact until the 1990s, with 
early interventions largely focused on (nuclear) safety and maintaining security of 
supply. In general, with energy security being regarded as closely linked to national 
security, Member States jealously guarded their sovereignty in relation to energy 
policy, and energy industries were mostly organised on national lines, often as 
publicly-owned monopolies. 
 
Things began to change in the late 1980s and 1990s as a result of two pressures. 
First, the desire to complete the EU internal market, by addressing indirect 
distortions to competition such as energy costs, coincided with a worldwide shift in 
energy policy away from public ownership and monopolisation towards privatisation 
and liberalisation. Relying on general competition law and free movement powers, 
the Commission moved to liberalise downstream gas and electricity markets, initially 
via a litigation strategy and subsequently through three successive waves of 
legislation (in 1996/98, 2003, and 2009). 
 
Second, increasing awareness of the adverse environmental impacts of energy 
production and consumption, and the cross-border nature of issues such as air 
pollution and climate change, led the EU to become increasingly active in regulating 
the environmental performance of the energy industries and the efficient use of 
energy. Although it was not until 2009, with the coming into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, that the EU acquired an express general legal competence in energy policy, 
this was in effect a belated de jure UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH (8¶V de facto position as a 
major policy actor on the European energy stage. 
 
What is now Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
gives the EU institutions shared competence with Member States to adopt measures 
WR µ(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy 
supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the 
interconnection of energy netwoUNV¶ Member State sovereignty over the exploitation 
of primary energy sources, their energy mix, and the general structure of their energy 
supply, including the ownership of national energy companies,18 is expressly 
preserved. In practice, however, the requirements of both liberalisation and 
environmental policies increasingly coQVWUDLQ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶IUHHGRP 
 
This is a trend which seems likely to continue. In 2015, the Commission launched its 
Framework Strategy for an Energy Union, with the aim of creating a genuinely cross-
border internal market in energy in order to achieve secure, sustainable, competitive 
                                            
18
 EU law is technically neutral on questions of property ownership ± Article 345 TFEU 
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and affordable energy supplies for European consumers. Considerable work is 
already under way to secure the technical compatibility of domestic energy markets 
and in late 2016 the Commission proposed another package of legislative measures 
(the so-FDOOHG µwinter package¶ ZKLFK ZRXOG IXUWKHU KDUPRQLVH 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶
energy policies. 
 
Impact of EU Law on UK Energy Policy 
 
8QOLNH VRPH RWKHU 0HPEHU 6WDWHV WKH 8.¶V HQHUJ\ SROLF\ KDV QRW EHHQ
fundamentally shaped by EU energy law. Not only has there been close alignment 
between the goals of UK and EU energy policy, but the UK has been in the vanguard 
of European ± and indeed global ± energy reform since the 1980s, both as regards 
the liberalisation of energy markets and subsequently in the transition to low-carbon 
energy systems. In general, therefore, the UK has been a strong supporter ± and 
indeed influential driver ± of EU energy policy. 
 
This is not to say that EU law has not sometimes had an impact. For instance, EU 
state aid law has shaped government support for renewables and, in particular, 
nuclear generation.19 The use of so-FDOOHG µJROGHQ VKDUHV¶ DV D PHDQV RI
government intervention in privatised energy companies has been severely restricted 
by the &-(8¶V ILQGLQJ that they constitute a restriction on free movement of capital 
and the right of free establishment. EU air quality legislation has largely been 
responsible for the decline of coal-fired power generation. The imposition of binding 
national targets for renewable energy consumption has also significantly accelerated 
the deployment of renewable energy sources in the UK, particularly in the electricity 
sector. Overall, though, it is fair to say that EU law has been a constraint upon, 
rather than a major determinant of, UK energy policy. 
 
However, this does not mean that the role of EU energy law has been unimportant. It 
has performed two major functions, both of which would be more difficult to replicate 
outside of the EU. The first is to facilitate trade between, and integration of, 
European energy systems. Of course, trade would not be impossible outside the EU. 
Oil, gas and coal are all traded on global markets, subject only to World Trade 
Organisation rules. But matters are more difficult for electricity and (downstream) gas 
supply, both of which are networked industries. This means that they depend upon 
the existence of an extensive infrastructure of wires and pipes to deliver energy from 
producers to consumers. In the case of electricity in particular, they also require 
detailed technical regulation to ensure the safe, reliable and efficient operation of the 
energy system. 7KH(8¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNWKXVSURYLGHVDPHDQVRIUHGXFLQJ
transaction costs and technical barriers to trade in gas and electricity by promoting 
harmonisation of national regulatory frameworks and facilitating common projects, 
such as the Single (wholesale) Electricity Market (SEM) between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, or the proposed North Sea offshore electricity grid. 
 
As already noted, the EU is actively promoting the integration of European energy 
markets via the Energy UnionDQGWKH8.¶VKLWKHUWRUDWKHU isolated energy systems 
are now increasingly physically integrated with other European markets, through the 
development of interconnectors. Integration makes sense in energy policy terms as a 
means of ensuring security of supply, in order to increase competitiveness and 
therefore reduce prices, and to facilitate the deployment of intermittent renewable 
                                            
19
 Financial subsidy for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station is currently the subject of a 
dispute before the ECJ 
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energy sources (by enabling intermittency to be balanced by imports).20 Given that 
the UK is a net importer of energy, and the UK gRYHUQPHQW¶VORZFDUERQDPELtions, it 
has been a strong supporter of market integration within the EU, and this is likely to 
continue to make sense unless its energy policy objectives change substantially. 
 
7KH VHFRQG LPSRUWDQW IXQFWLRQ SHUIRUPHG E\ (8 HQHUJ\ ODZ LV WR µORFN LQ¶ HQHUgy 
policy goals, by limiting the extent to which policy can change through unilateral 
Member State action. This has the effect of promoting policy stability ± a particularly 
important concern in relation to the energy industries, which are highly capital-
intensive industries operating over long time horizons. In a period, such as the 
present, of high capital demand ± where investment is required both to replace aging 
energy infrastructure and to facilitate the low carbon transition ± policy stability is 
essential to promote investor confidence. But it is difficult to achieve on a purely 
GRPHVWLF EDVLV JLYHQ WKH 8.¶V KLJKO\ IOH[LEOH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQWV DQG 
adversarial political system. 
 
The external constraint provided by EU law is also valuable for internal policy actors. 
For instance, the devolved Scottish government has high ambitions to exploit 
6FRWODQG¶VYDVWUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\SRWHQWLDOEXWOLPLWHGSROLF\FRPSHWHQFHZLWKLQWKH
current devolution settlement to enable it to achieve those ambitions. The policy 
support provided by EU law therefore gives some guarantee that regulatory powers 
retained at the UK level will continue to be exercised in a way that supports 
renewables expansion, as well as, for instance, enables access to EU-level funding 
for low-carbon investment, and research and development. 
 
Of course, both of these functions performed by EU energy law have their 
downsides. For instance, as market integration has advanced, regulatory decision-
making, particularly in relation to technical market and network operation, has to 
some extent shifted from domestic to EU-level regulators ± ACER (the Agency for 
the Co-operation of Energy Regulators), ENTSO-E and ENTSOG (European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and for Gas), which were 
set up as part of the 2009 liberalisation package. Although UK regulators and 
network operators are powerful players in these decision-making fora, they are 
difficult to subject to wider democratic and public accountability at the domestic level 
(although they are subject to oversight by the European Parliament). Accordingly, 
the shift of regulatory capacity to the European level may have had the effect of 
undermining hard-won gains in the accountability of domestic regulators, which were 
the subject of intense debate in the 1990s. 
 
In addition, while locking-in energy policy promotes stability, it also necessarily 
makes it more difficult to achieve policy change. This may therefore lock-in policy 
mistakes. For instance, VAT on domestic fuel was a policy ± much criticised at the 
time ± introduced by the Major government in 1993, but EU law meant that the 
subsequent Labour government was able only to reduce the VAT rate to 5% rather 
than to abolish it altogether. 7KH8.¶VUHGXFHGUDWHRI9$7RQVRPe energy-saving 
products has also been held to be incompatible with EU tax law. More 
fundamentally, EU law locks-in a market-based energy system. Notwithstanding 
ongoing criticLVP RI WKH 8.¶V OLEHUDOLVHG HQHUJ\ PDUNHWV WKLV WKHUHIRUH OLPLWV WKH
extent to which new thinking about, for instance, the role of public or community 
                                            
20
 For physical reasons, electricity supply and demand must be kept in balance at all times. 
On the current state of technological development, electricity also cannot easily be stored, 
hence keeping the electricity system in balance is a major challenge for energy regulators 
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ownership, the structure of energy markets, or the balance between markets and 
planning can be pursued. 
 
Brexit and UK Energy Policy 
 
Despite these criticisms, energy policy did not feature significantly in debates leading 
up to the EU referendum, nor has it done so subsequently. Given the close 
alignment of UK and EU energy policy, Brexit is unlikely to produce major changes in 
UK energy policy, at least in the short term, and existing EU-derived market and 
environmental rules will largely be given continuity of effect via the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill. Nevertheless, in addition to the potential general economic effects 
of Brexit in relation to free movement of workers, availability of investment capital 
and supply chain impacts, some energy-specific issues do require to be addressed. 
 
Euratom 
 
The issue here which has attracted greatest attention so far is the implications of 
Brexit for the nuclear industry. One apparently unanticipated consequence of Brexit 
is that, in its Article 50 notification, the UK government also gave notice of its 
intention to withdraw from Euratom, which now shares an institutional framework 
with the EU. Although legal opinion is divided on whether withdrawal is legally 
required, the prime mLQLVWHU¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQHQGLQJWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH&-(8RYHU
the UK makes it politically inevitable. 
 
Euratom currently provides the legal framework for the safe and secure operation of 
civil nuclear power generation and nuclear waste disposal in the UK, as well as 
governing the supply of nuclear materials for power generation and other (for 
example, medical) uses into and out of the Community, the free movement of 
nuclear workers and co-operation in nuclear research and development. It is 
therefore essential that a replacement regulatory framework is put in place before 
the UK leaves the EU in order to comply with international non-proliferation 
obligations, and to ensure that the nuclear industry can continue to operate. 
 
A new Nuclear Safeguards Bill was announced in the 2017 4XHHQ¶V6SHHFK, which 
will transfer regulatory responsibility for safety and security to the (existing) Office for 
Nuclear Regulation. In addition, the UK gRYHUQPHQW¶Vnegotiating position states its 
intention to maintain close co-operation with Euratom, as well as to sign new nuclear 
co-operation agreements with other key nuclear states. However, there remains 
some doubt as to whether suitable arrangements can be put in place in time. 
 
 
Internal Energy Market 
 
$VHFRQGNH\ LVVXHFRQFHUQV WKH8.¶VFRQWLQXHGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH(8¶V Internal 
Energy Market (IEM). The general consensus is that continued participation would 
make sense for the reasons discussed above, and in particular to secure the future 
RI ,UHODQG¶V 6(0 DQG WR DYRLG GLVUXSWLRQ DQG LQHIILFLHQFies in the operation of 
interconnectors ± a view apparently shared by the Energy Secretary. The EU27 may 
also favour continued UK participation in the IEM, given that it is already seeking to 
extend the Energy 8QLRQEH\RQG WKH(8¶VERUGHUVFor instance, Norway currently 
participates fully in the IEM via the EEA, as do a number of EU candidate countries 
in south east Europe via the Energy Community Treaty, and Switzerland (in some 
respects) via a bilateral agreement. 
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Nevertheless, there are potential obstacles and disadvantages to continued UK 
participation in the IEM. As regards the former, the UK gRYHUQPHQW¶V µUHG OLQHV¶ LQ
respect of free movement and CJEU jurisdiction may prove to be insurmountable 
obstacles, as might be the (XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQVLVWHQFH that there should be no 
preferential access to the single market for particular sectors. As regards the latter, 
continued participation in the IEM from outside the EU would almost certainly mean 
a loss of influence for the UK in EU regulatory decision-making, making it a rule-
taker, rather than a rule-maker. Moreover, the loss of UK influence might change the 
future direction of EU energy policy in ways which UK governments and regulators 
might find unpalatable. 
 
Green Energy 
 
If the UK remains part of the IEM, it will continue to be bound by most EU green 
energy laws, including new obligations in relation to energy efficiency and renewable 
HQHUJ\ FRQWDLQHG LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V winter package. Nevertheless, decisions 
require to be made on whether to seek to continue to participate in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (which includes major power generators) and on how to replace EU 
research and investment schemes for low-carbon energy. 
 
However, if the UK leaves the IEM, green energy is the area in which policy change 
seems most likely. The current Conservative government is no fan of EU energy 
efficiency and renewable energy targets, and has already (prior to the EU 
referendum) withdrawn a range of subsidy and support schemes. Even post-Brexit, 
the UK will remain subject to domestic and international climate change obligations, 
as well as internal pressures from the devolved governments. But it is unclear how 
effective these will be in ensuring the low carbon energy transition remains on track. 
 
Conclusion 
 
7KHGHVLUHWRµWDNHEDFNFRQWURO¶ZKLFKPRWLYDWHGWKHGHFLVLRQWROHDYHWKH(8LVRQH
which seems to make little sense in the energy sector. Not only has the UK been a 
stronger influence over EU energy law and policy than vice versa, but there are 
persuasive arguments in favour of continued energy market integration. At a time 
when policy stability is particularly important to the energy industries, Brexit therefore 
seems like a distraction. +RZHYHULWUHPDLQVWREHVHHQKRZIDUµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶
will be possible post-Brexit, or alternatively how any new policy flexibility will be used 
in practice. 
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